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FiGhtinG the wronG FiGht: why the mlp 
parity act iS a miSGuiDeD attempt at achievinG 
renewable enerGy capital raiSinG parity
David Powers, CPA*
I. IntroductIon
During the past three decades, renewable energy has shifted from being an afterthought to a preferred source of power in the United States.1 This shift comes at a 
cost. Building renewable energy projects, transitioning from 
more traditional energy sources, and keeping America’s energy 
infrastructure up to date requires massive amounts of capital 
investment in order to be feasible.2 Raising the necessary capital 
is one of the biggest obstacles facing renewable energy growth.3 
The ability to access the public equity markets to overcome this 
obstacle and fund these projects will be paramount to the contin-
ued growth of the renewable energy sector.4
Oil and gas energy producers have used the master limited 
partnership (“MLP”) as a means to efficiently raise capital in 
the public equity markets.5 MLPs are traded on public stock 
exchanges. Rather than shares, an investor purchases units that 
are limited partnership interests.6 The sponsor is the general 
partner, who typically retains two percent ownership in the 
MLP.7 Because the MLP is structured as a flow through entity,8 
this affords two main benefits: (1) that the MLP does not pay any 
tax at the entity level;9 and (2) that the entity has the ability to 
make special allocations of income and expenses, which allows 
the general partner to create innovative incentive structures.10
In order to qualify as an MLP, 90 percent or more of the gross 
income of the partnership must be “qualifying income.”11 Per 
section 7704(d)(1)(E) of the Internal Revenue Code, qualifying 
income consists of “income and gains derived from the explora-
tion, development, mining or production, processing, refining, 
transportation (including pipelines transporting gas, oil, or prod-
ucts thereof), or the marketing of any mineral or natural resource 
(including fertilizer, geothermal energy, and timber) . . . .”12 While 
the Internal Revenue Code specifically allows ventures involved 
in the exploration, development, mining and productions of oil 
and gas to pay zero entity level tax, the production of wind, solar 
or hydroelectric power is not considered qualifying income and 
thus cannot utilize the MLP structure.13
As a result, producers of renewable energies have had to 
raise public equity through other means and have tried to provide 
energy investors the tax-free yield they desire in different ways.14 
One such way in which renewable energy investors provide energy 
investors with tax free yield is through the use of an investment 
vehicle known as the yieldco.15 Yieldcos are created by a parent 
company, again known as the sponsor, who is engaged in the 
building of renewable energy assets.16 The sponsor, having built 
wind or solar assets is eligible to claim a number of tax credits and 
accelerated depreciation deductions. Once the assets are built, and 
in some cases, long-term contracts secured to purchase the elec-
tricity, the sponsor will sell or contribute the assets to a yieldco. 
As a result, the hallmark characteristics of a yieldco are an asset 
or assets producing long-term steady cash flow, and large amounts 
of tax credits or tax deductions which would have been generated 
through the building of the facility.17 The resulting yieldco is a 
corporation which, despite having positive cash flow and making 
distributions to its investors, will not have taxable income for a 
number of years because the deductions and credits will create a 
“tax shield” that is carried forward until used completely.18 The 
lack of taxable income allows the corporation to make distribu-
tions tax-free (i.e. the person receiving the distribution does not 
pay tax on the dividends).19 This is because when a corporation 
with no taxable income makes distributions, instead of being 
considered a dividend, the distributions are instead considered a 
tax-free return of capital.20
Despite its name, the yieldco is legally no different from any 
other corporation trading on a public equity market.21 The cor-
poration simply happens to possess yield producing renewable 
energy assets and the associated tax credits and deductions.22 
However, it is important to note that the entity will become tax-
able at prevailing rates, and investors will pay tax on any divi-
dends received when these tax credits and deductions are used in 
their entirety.23 At that point, the corporation would pay taxes in 
the same manner as any other corporation, unless new assets are 
purchased which carry further deductions and credits.24
As an alternative, the yieldco could liquidate or restructure, 
in effect having a limited life. In this case, the market must take 
this future potential tax or limited life into account when calculat-
ing the enterprise value of a yieldco.25 Therefore, from a purely 
tax standpoint, the yieldco is less efficient than an MLP, and the 
sophisticated investor would generally prefer an MLP when faced 
with the same circumstances.26 This has the effect, at least in 
theory, of making the cost of capital higher for the yieldco.27
Congress, in recognizing the unavailability of the MLP 
structure to the renewable energy sector as a disadvantage, 
is making an attempt to rectify the situation by introducing 
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a bill entitled The Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act 
(“MLPPA”).28 In short, the bill would expand qualifying income 
to include renewable sources of energy, which opens up the MLP 
structure to renewable energy producers and allow them to raise 
capital through the same structure that oil and gas producers 
have utilized for years.29 While most of the press regarding the 
bill has been positive, and there has been no outspoken opposi-
tion, there remain significant challenges to its passage. There is 
the possibility that the bill will be held hostage by further tax 
reform.30 Specifically, some may support the bill only if the other 
tax credits available to renewable energy are repealed, in effect 
viewing MLP treatment for renewable energy providers as a sub-
sidy on top of a subsidy.31
Many would agree that promoting renewable energy is a 
worthwhile endeavor because it would promote a cleaner envi-
ronment and reduce dependence on imported oil.32 Allowing 
renewable energy access to the same public equity capital as the 
oil and gas industries would be an important step in promoting 
renewable energy growth. However, eliminating the ability of 
the oil and gas industry to utilize the MLP rather than opening 
it up to the renewable energy sector best achieves this objective.
By exploring the broad history and current landscape of the 
relevant tax code, this paper aims to show that the current use of 
the MLP within the energy sector is inconsistent with and con-
travenes the original intent of Congress. As a result, those wish-
ing to promote renewable energy as a preferred source of energy 
and achieve capital raising equality with fossil fuel sources are 
fighting the wrong fight in seeking parity within the MLP land-
scape. Instead of broadening the scope of the MLP to include 
renewable energy, the structure should be limited in such a way 
as to preclude oil and gas companies from operating as MLPs.33
Part II A of this paper explores the history, mechanics and 
legislative background of the MLP. Part II B of this paper explains 
the Investment Tax Credit (“ITC”) and the Production Tax Credit 
(“PTC”), both of which are integral to understanding the current 
tax landscape of renewable energy. This part also explores the 
yieldco, the primary investment vehicle that renewable energy 
uses as an alternative to the MLP. Part III explains why the MLP 
Parity Act is a misguided attempt at achieving capital raising 
parity, and asserts that the better option is to discontinue the oil 
and gas industry’s ability to utilize the MLP. Part IV explains the 
likely objections to such a proposal and Part V concludes.
II A. the hIstory And mechAnIcs of the  
mAster lImIted pArtnershIp
In the 1970’s, the highest individual tax bracket was seventy 
percent, and tax shelters utilizing the partnership form were a 
popular way to shelter income. Just as partners were taxed on 
their share of taxable income, partners were also able to utilize 
their share of partnership losses. Today, various regulations limit 
the amount of losses that an investor can utilize,34 but at that time 
any and all losses from the partnership could be used to shield 
personal income tax. For these reasons, the Apache Petroleum 
Company formed thirty-three oil and gas partnerships between 
1959 and 1978. The main appeal of these partnerships were their 
tax sheltering properties.35 The partnerships were engaged in the 
exploration of oil, and their main allure was the fact that sixty-
five percent of the investment could be written off in the first 
year and ninety percent within three years.36 If the entity found 
oil, the investor also had the possibility of making a large return 
on the money invested.37 Despite these benefits, investors in the 
partnership had no readily available means to sell the partnership 
interest.38 As a result, some investors, who had initially invested 
for the tax benefits, now faced the dilemma of owning an illiquid 
partnership interest that started producing taxable income after 
its tax benefits were exhausted. This confluence of events led to 
the formation of the first MLP:
[i]n February 1981, Ray Plank, president and chief 
executive officer of the Apache Petroleum Co., had a 
decision to make. The limited partnership tax shelter[s] 
formed eight-to-ten years earlier [were] now generat-
ing taxable income, and many discussions and debates 
ensued as to what should be done with these shelters. . . 
What followed was a roll-up of the shelters into a single 
MLP.39 A roll-up provides existing limited partners in 
private or nontraded partnerships with the opportunity 
to exchange their interests for interest in an MLP. Thus, 
the roll-up of the Apache shelters into a single MLP pro-
vided two results. First, it allowed for the collection of 
thirty-three separate limited partnerships into one, and 
second, it provided the investors with a liquid security 
for their interest [which] could be publicly traded. The 
success of the MLP was charted in the marketplace.40
At the same time this occurred, the highest tax bracket for 
individuals decreased from seventy percent to fifty percent. With 
the corporate rate at forty-six percent, the individual rate became, 
for the first time, comparable to the corporate rate. When taking 
into account other factors, such as the double taxation problem 
of corporations, for the first time in history being taxed as an 
individual was preferable to being taxed as a corporation.41
As early as 1983, Forbes magazine predicted the disincor-
poration of America in order to avoid the corporate tax.42 The 
MLP quickly caught on, and by 1987 there were over 100 MLP 
IPOs.43 While industries that were familiar to the partnership 
form, such as oil, gas and real estate, were most common (i.e. 
those which were common tax shelters in the 1970’s), any type 
of business could use the structure, and at one time the Boston 
Celtics, La Quinta Motor Inn, casinos and financial advisors 
were all structured as MLPs.44
The Treasury Department, concerned that the decline of 
corporate tax was becoming a trend, began to petition Congress 
as early as 1984.45 They claimed that a publicly traded partner-
ship was merely a corporation in disguise and therefore should 
pay corporate tax.46 They also claimed that the complexities of 
partnership taxation were too much of an administrative burden 
for the average taxpayer.47 In 1984 they unsuccessfully proposed 
to tax any partnership with more than thirty-five partners as 
a corporation.48 It was not until the summer of 1987 that suc-
cessful action was taken. At that time, The Omnibus Budget 
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Reconciliation Act of 1987 (“OBRA”) was enacted.49 It added 
three new sections to the Internal Revenue Code, with section 
7704 being the most relevant.
Section 7704 applies to taxable years beginning after 
December 31, 1987.50 Subsection (a) states the general rule 
that “a publicly traded partnership shall be treated as a corpo-
ration.”51 Subsection (b) defines “publicly traded partnership” 
and subsection (c) is entitled “[e]xception for partnerships with 
passive type income.”52 It explains that when 90 percent of a 
partnership’s gross income is considered qualifying income, the 
exception will be met. Section 7704(d)(1) lists the types of qual-
ifying income. They include interest, dividends, real property 
rents, gains from disposition of real property and most relevant 
for present purposes: 
income and gains derived from the exploration, devel-
opment, mining or production, processing, refining, 
transportation (including pipelines transporting gas, 
oil, or products thereof), or the marketing of any min-
eral or natural resource (including fertilizer, geothermal 
energy, and timber), industrial source carbon dioxide, 
or the transportation or storage of any fuel. . . 53
As a result, if ninety percent of the entity’s gross income 
can be considered qualifying income, an MLP can get the best of 
both worlds: the liquidity associated with being publicly traded 
on an exchange and no corporate level income tax.
Utilizing this structure, companies engaged in the produc-
tion, transportation, and storage of fossil fuels and its related 
infrastructure (known as the sponsor and serving as the MLP’s 
general partner) have been able to successfully raise large 
amounts of capital from public sources.54 Like investors in util-
ity companies and energy stocks, typically the MLP has attracted 
investors seeking long-term stable yield, and in fact, most MLPs 
distribute large amounts of their available cash to their investors. 
In most cases, the partnership agreement will require the MLP to 
distribute all “available cash.”55
One of the main reasons that most MLPs have high yields is 
due to the nature of the incentive structure.56 In most MLP struc-
tures, the general partner is incentivized to increase cash distribu-
tions to investors as much as possible because they own incentive 
distribution rights (“IDR”).57 The IDRs are similar to a carried 
interest, which will be familiar to those who follow the hedge 
fund and private equity industries; instead of being based upon net 
income, however, IDRs are based upon cash distributed.58
In essence, IDRs are partnership interests that are subordi-
nate to the limited partners’ (public) investment. This means that 
they share a large portion of the downside risk, but they have the 
benefit of also sharing in a much larger portion of the upside.59 
Mechanically, when cash distributions are made, the public is 
first paid its distributions up to an amount stated in the offering 
document.60 The sponsor shares pro-rata (the general partner 
will typically own two percent of the MLP and thus take two 
percent of the cash).61 Distributions exceeding the stated amount 
is then subject to a sliding scale, increasing from two percent to 
fifteen percent, twenty five percent and as high as fifty percent. 
This means, that despite injecting two percent of the capital, 
the general partner can take up to fifty percent of the cash dis-
tributed.62 This provides a powerful incentive for the sponsor to 
maximize distributions.63
It may seem that investors’ and sponsors’ interests are aligned 
in seeking to maximize distributions.64 However, this incentive 
can perversely affect management’s decision-making process.65 
Examples include diluting investors by offering new MLP units 
to raise capital to increase distributions, obtaining new debt to 
finance distributions, and delaying or ignoring capital improve-
ments to instead use cash for distribution purposes.66 In each of 
these situations, investors’ and sponsors’ interests diverge.67 Since 
there is no clawback68 function associated with the incentive dis-
tribution rights, this incentive structure favors short term gains at 
the potential risk of long term financial health.69
While a sponsor would argue that the IDR structure com-
pensates it for the risk it takes in owning subordinate units 
and for managing the MLP, the mechanics are quite different. 
Similar to carried interest, the compensation is not a deduction 
to the MLP and income to the sponsor, but instead a reallocation 
of income away from the public’s units to the sponsor.70 It should 
also be noted that a reallocation as described above is something 
that is available only in the partnership form71 and therefore is a 
benefit unique to the partnership.72 This has the effect of making 
the economics of an investment in an MLP potentially very dif-
ferent from that of a traditional publicly traded corporation.
At this point, it may not be self-evident as to why any 
exception exists for a publicly traded entity to be exempt from 
tax. Two main questions arise. First, why create any exception 
at all for publicly traded partnerships and instead simply make 
all publicly traded partnerships taxable? Second, if we accept 
that some should be exempt from tax, why are the oil and gas 
industries exempt?
As stated above, Section 7704(c) is entitled “[e]xception for 
partnerships with passive-type income,” so when considering the 
taxability of a publicly traded partnership, we can more narrowly 
ask, why create an exception for passive-type income? Here, the 
legislative history is instructive.
In general, the purpose of distinguishing between 
passive-type income and other income is to distinguish 
those partnerships that are engaged in activities com-
monly considered as essentially no more than invest-
ments, and those activities more typically conducted in 
corporate form that are in the nature of active business 
activities. In the former case, the rationale for impos-
ing an additional corporate-level tax on investments 
in publicly traded partnership form is less compelling, 
because purchasers of such partnership interests could 
in most cases independently acquire such investments 
(or the income has already been subject to corporate-
level tax, in the case of dividends). Where the activity 
of the partnership does not fall into the category of gen-
erating passive-type income, however, it is less likely 
that direct interests in the activity would be available 
to investors; rather, it is more likely that such activities 
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would be conducted in corporate form and would there-
fore be subject to corporate level tax before profits 
reached the hands of investors.73
In terms of interest, dividends, real property rents and 
gains from the disposition of real property, to the extent that the 
income truly is passive, “imposing an extra layer of corporate 
tax makes little sense.”74 Legislative history also instructs as to 
when passive activity may become active.
In determining whether income is treated as passive-type 
income under the provision, in the case of interest and 
real property rents, it is not intended that amounts con-
tingent on profits be treated as interest or rent. Similarly, 
amounts based on gross income earned in connection 
with a non-real estate related activity such as a fast food 
operation are not treated as passive-type income. Interest 
or rent (or other amounts) contingent on profits involves 
a greater degree of risk, and also a greater potential for 
economic gain, than fixed (or even a market-indexed) 
rate of interest or rent, and thus is more properly regarded 
as from an underlying active business activity.75
While the above makes clear when rents or interest may 
cease to be passive, there is no analogous provision concerning 
natural resources. While investments in natural resources may be 
similar to collecting rent or interest, as in the case where an MLP 
“merely passes along royalties from a productive well or steady 
income from a pipeline,”76 the legislative history offers no help 
in determining when or how the line might be crossed. Instead, 
a reading of the legislative history might leave one wondering 
whether any such line exists:
In the case of natural resources activities, special con-
siderations apply. Thus, passive-type income from such 
activities is considerably broader, and includes income 
and gains from exploration, development, mining or 
production, refining, transportation (including through 
pipelines transporting gas, oil, or products thereof), or 
marketing of, any mineral or natural resource, includ-
ing geothermal energy and timber. (emphasis added) 
Many attribute these “special considerations” to powerful 
Texas Senator Lloyd Bentsen, who had strong ties to the oil 
and gas industry.77 In his New York Times article Victor Fleisher 
states bluntly “that is code for ‘effective lobbying.” He goes on 
to explain that today’s MLPs are not simply passive type invest-
ments, instead many are 
growth companies with volatile earnings. They hold 
out the promise of capital appreciation, not just steady 
income, to attract investors. As more MLP’s come to 
resemble normal operating companies, the tax loophole 
looks more like a straightforward tax subsidy for fos-
sil fuel production. From an environmental standpoint, 
this is exactly backward. We should be taxing carbon 
production, not subsidizing it.78
It is clear that today’s MLPs are not analogous to an invest-
ment that a group of people may purchase individually, nor are 
they passive investment vehicles. Instead they are very sophisti-
cated operating companies. To include them under the heading 
of passive investments is to distort the original intent Congress 
had when Section 7704 was added to the Internal Revenue Code.
II b. the Investment tAx credIt,  
the productIon tAx credIt And the yIeldco
The yieldCo has evolved as an effective means for producers 
of renewable energy to raise public capital in a world where the 
MLP structure is unavailable due to the current definition of quali-
fying income.79 Essentially looking to create a synthetic MLP, the 
producers of the wind or solar energy producing assets (again, the 
sponsor) contribute these assets along with the tax credits they 
generated into a newly formed corporation.80 The tax credits are a 
key part of the equation in that they allow the yieldCo to shield tax 
and thus make tax-free distributions.81 In most circumstances, the 
sponsor has already completed building these assets and, in many 
cases, has already entered into long term contracts for the electric-
ity these assets will produce.82 The result is a corporation owning 
completed projects with the ability to produce long-term stable 
yield that will be tax-free for a period of time.83 The sponsor will 
usually retain a voting majority in the corporation thus retaining 
control84 and, in many cases, the yieldCo will have a right of first 
offer for the sponsor’s future projects.85
In order to compare the MLP and the YieldCo, it must first 
be understood that the YieldCo structure is not nearly as attrac-
tive without the tax credits that its assets generate.86 These tax 
credits, known as the Federal Investment Tax Credit (“ITC”)87 
and the Federal Production Tax Credit (“PTC”)88 are designed to 
promote investment in renewable energy projects and production 
of renewable energy89 and offer a dollar for dollar reduction in 
the income taxes they would otherwise have to pay the federal 
government.90 The ITC currently offers a tax credit of thirty 
percent of the amount invested in renewable energy projects,91 
however, this is scheduled to be reduced to ten percent at the 
end of 2023 with a phase out beginning in 2020.92 The PTC is 
offered per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated from renew-
able energy sources.93 The PTC will begin phasing out in 2017 
and will be completely phased out within five years. A taxpayer 
gets the benefit of one credit or the other, but cannot take both.94
The tax benefits95 generated will far outweigh the amount of 
taxable income generated in the first year of operation96 and are 
carried forward until used completely by offsetting future taxable 
income. Typically, this period will last five to ten years.97 During 
this time, distributions made by the corporation will be considered 
return of capital rather than dividend income and will be tax-free.98
With this background, we can see that almost all energy pro-
duced in the United States is subsidized in one way or another.99 
Renewable energy producers, while not eligible to be treated as 
an MLP, nevertheless take advantage of significant tax credits.100 
As compared with the MLP whose investors enjoy distributions 
that are typically eighty percent tax-free and can last indefinitely, 
the YieldCo offers distributions that are 100% tax-free and can 
last five to ten years.101
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It is important to understand that if an MLP were to 
somehow fail the qualifying income test and be taxed as a cor-
poration, that entity, although legally a partnership, would pay 
corporate tax.102 Economically, at least from a tax perspective, 
it would therefore be no different from the yieldco.103 Of course, 
this entity would not have the renewable energy tax credits avail-
able to it. Assuming all else was equal and the entity still had its 
other tax deductions available, corporate tax would be payable 
on net income like any other corporation.104 Distributions would 
be split between return of capital and dividend income with per-
sonal income tax being paid on the dividend portion.105
III. the mlp pArIty Act And Why It Is  
A mIsguIded Attempt At pArIty
The Master Limited Partnership Parity Act (“MLPPA”) 
was initially introduced in September of 2012106 and again later 
in April of 2013.107 After both attempts died in Congress, the 
MLPPA has again been reintroduced in June of 2015.108 Senator 
Christopher Coons explains the MLPPA:
The MLP Parity Act simply expands the definition of 
“qualified” sources to include clean energy resources 
and infrastructure projects. Specifically included are 
those energy technologies that qualify under Sections 
45 and 48 of the tax code, including wind, closed and 
open loop biomass, geothermal, solar, municipal solid 
waste, hydropower, marine and hydrokinetic, fuel cells, 
and combined heat and power.
The legislation also allows for a range of transportation 
fuels to qualify, including cellulosic, ethanol, biodiesel, 
and algae-based fuels, as well as energy-efficient 
upgrades for buildings, electricity storage, carbon cap-
ture and storage, renewable chemicals, and waste-heat-
to-power technologies.
The MLP Parity Act does not affect any current MLP 
entity. All projects currently eligible to structure as 
MLPs would continue to qualify exactly as they would 
under existing law.109
The website goes on to list a number of supporters, includ-
ing sponsors from the Senate and the House, both Democrat 
and Republican, as well as numerous businesses, trade asso-
ciations, environmental advocates and think tanks.110 Other 
news articles tout the MLPPA as a “no brainer” for renewable 
energy.111 While its sponsors laud the bill for having bipartisan 
support and other news articles proclaim that it is “ready for 
passage,”112 its passage is far from guaranteed. If the MLPPA is 
buried in other tax reform it will be a long shot for it to make it 
through Congress.113
Senator Coons explains the MLPPA as “[a] bill to level the 
playing field by giving investors in renewable energy projects 
access to a decades-old corporate structure with a tax advan-
tage currently available only to investors in fossil fuel-based 
energy projects.”114 While leveling the playing field is certainly 
an admirable goal when it comes to renewable energy, Senator 
Coons and supporters fail to consider the negative aspects of the 
MLP.115 There are three main reasons why the MLPPA should 
not be passed.
First, in 1987, Congress decided to close the MLP loophole 
by taxing all publicly traded partnerships as corporations except 
for those engaged in passive type activities.116 Through effective 
lobbying, the oil and gas industry was able to maintain that loop-
hole in the tax code by asserting that they should be considered 
a passive activity and continue to utilize the MLP structure.117 
Allowing certain types of publicly traded partnerships to oper-
ate without incurring taxation was based upon the idea that they 
held such investments that were akin to investments one could 
purchase in their individual capacity.118 The current MLPs do 
not resemble pooled passive investments; rather they are large 
operating companies.119 Allowing them to operate as MLPs is 
clearly in direct contravention of Congress’ original intent.120 
Renewable energy providers are no different. Large scale solar 
projects and wind farms are not passive activities which inves-
tors can purchase individually or as a pooled investment. They 
require skilled management teams and operational expertise121 
and therefore should not be considered passive investments eli-
gible for MLP treatment.
Second, allowing MLPs to operate without incurring entity 
level tax costs the Treasury millions in tax revenue each year. In 
February of 2015, President Obama’s 2016 budget proposed to 
eliminate the availability of the MLP to the oil and gas industry 
by 2021.122 The proposal projected that taxing MLPs as corpora-
tions would rise upwards of $300 million a year in tax revenue 
starting in 2021.123 This again appeared in the 2017 budget.124 
While the 2016 budget proposal attracted some media attention, 
the 2017 proposal along with the entire 2017 budget garnered 
minimal media coverage and has largely been viewed as irrel-
evant.125 Nevertheless, the budget proposals serve to quantify 
the amount of subsidies the oil and gas industry receive each 
year by approximating the amount of taxes saved by utilizing the 
MLP structure.
Lastly, the MLP’s incentive structure is designed to benefit 
the sponsor at the detriment of investors. Instead of being man-
aged by a board of directors, MLPs are frequently managed by 
a general partner (or a manager when structured as an LLC) 
and, as a result, investors in MLPs may have less protection 
than investors in corporations.126 Furthermore, ownership of the 
IDRs incentivizes management behavior, which diverges from 
investors’ best interests127 and substantial evidence exists that 
many retail investors do not understand exactly what they are 
buying when they purchase MLP units on the stock exchange.
Rather than expanding the MLP to include renewable 
energy sources, those that truly wish to level the playing field 
should be focused on closing this loophole available to oil and 
gas.128 In order to put the renewable energy industry on par with 
fossil fuels, the appropriate step should be eliminating Section 
7704(d)(1)(E) from the Internal Revenue Code. This would have 
the effect of eliminating the tax subsidies available to fossil fuels 
by taxing them as any other operating company129 and in the 
process raising tax revenues.
35Fall 2016
Iv. objectIons
There are obvious hurdles in overhauling a major section 
of the tax code.130 MLPs have been around for almost thirty 
years, and there are currently over 130 of them trading on public 
stock exchanges.131 If entity level taxes were imposed on MLPs, 
this would likely be phased in slowly over a number of years.132 
Nevertheless, the imposition of future taxes would affect future 
earnings projections and current valuations.133 Likewise, it 
would undoubtedly have an effect on the ability of oil and gas 
sponsors to raise public equity for future projects.134 The result-
ing market turmoil would be enough for opponents to strongly 
resist change of the status quo. Opponents would argue that this 
turmoil and the higher cost of capital for raising public equity 
would slow the growth of American’s energy infrastructure and 
cause consumer energy prices to rise.135
Americans have become accustomed to cheap energy over 
the last few decades.136 Despite enjoying some of the cheapest 
energy prices in the world, Americans continue to seek cheaper 
energy.137 Politicians continually promise policies to lower energy 
prices and consumers purchase some of the least fuel-efficient 
automobiles in the world.138 As a result, any policy raising energy 
prices is likely to be extremely unpopular and will face strong 
headwinds.139 Navigating and overcoming these political chal-
lenges, although problematic and particularly troublesome, will be 
a necessary step in reforming the tax code to achieve parity.
In addition, certain elected leaders have a continuous his-
tory of ignoring climate change140 and as a result have been 
unsympathetic towards tax reform to promote renewable energy 
at the expense of the oil and gas industry.141 As stated above, 
some members of Congress have been unwilling to support MLP 
Parity while the ITC and PTC are still in existence.142 Those 
members would probably argue that because of the availability 
of the tax credits, the renewable energy sector already has capital 
raising parity with the oil and gas industry.
It is arguable that the ITC and PTC are more valuable 
than the MLP structure, and in fact there seems to be a general 
consensus that trading tax credits for the MLP structure would 
be a net negative for the renewable energy sector.143 While the 
ITC and PTC are scheduled to phase out and end, this has been 
the case before and in each case they have been renewed and in 
some cases expanded.144 As a result, any legislation repealing 
the availability of the MLP to oil and gas while the ITC and 
PTC are still in effect is likely to be extremely hard to pass. 
Unfortunately, this probably means that any chance of repealing 
the MLP structure may also require repeal of the ITC and PTC.
v. conclusIon
Although repealing section 7704(d)(1)(E) may be chal-
lenging, it is the best option for achieving capital raising par-
ity between fossil fuels and renewable energy. Furthermore, it 
is important that those arguing for parity for renewable energy 
understand that enacting the MLP Parity Act can and will have 
consequences beyond simply allowing producers of renewable 
energy more tax efficient public capital. The MLP Parity Act 
will expand and continue the use of the MLP, which, in turn, 
will have the effect of fueling America’s continued energy irre-
sponsibility with subsidized energy. It will expand the use of an 
investment structure that Congress had good reason to shut the 
door on in 1987 but survived only due to oil and gas lobbyists. It 
will promote an investment, which although available to the gen-
eral public, has recently come under fire as a vehicle enabling 
managers to take short term risks that may be detrimental to the 
long-term health of the company.
While oil and gas has its own set of tax subsidies unique 
to their industry, the renewable energy industry has valuable 
tax subsidies in the form of the ITC and the PTC. Advocates 
seeking capital raising parity for renewable energy would be 
well advised to note the opposition to allowing the renewable 
energy sector access to the MLP markets while the ITC and PTC 
are still in effect. Enacting the MLP Parity Act and expanding 
section 7704 to include renewable energy would allow renew-
able energy the use of the MLP structure to raise public capital 
alongside oil and gas. However, if enacted it would most likely 
make it much harder, if not impossible, to renew the ITC and 
PTC in the future.
While those who support a policy towards increasing 
America’s use of renewable energy would certainly prefer to 
keep the ITC and PTC while gaining access to the MLP struc-
ture, the current state of American politics make this an unlikely 
proposition. As a result, proponents of the MLP Parity Act may 
be forced to trade the ITC and PTC for access to the MLP struc-
ture or wait until the tax credits expire. If supporters of capital 
raising parity for renewable energy also seek to retain the ITC 
and PTC, an attempt to repeal section 7704(d)(1)(E) has a better 
chance at achieving that goal than the MLP Parity Act and in the 
process, achieves significantly more. 
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